One of the liveliest debates about cognition concerns whether our cognition sometimes extends beyond our brains and bodies. One party says Yes, another No. This paper shows that debate between these parties has been epistemologically confused and requires reorienting. Both parties frequently appeal to empirical considerations and to extra-empirical theoretical virtues to support claims about where cognition is. These things should constrain their claims, but cannot do all the work hoped. This is because of the overlooked fact, uncovered in this paper, that we could never distinguish the rival views empirically or by typical theoretical virtues. I show this by drawing on recent work on testing, predictive accuracy, and theoretical virtues. The recommendation to emerge is that we step back from debate about where cognition is, to the epistemology of what cognition is.
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possibility that HEMC follows from HEC (p. 393ff.). After quickly dismissing this possibility, he goes on to argue for TEM, not simply HEMC. 8 Now to clarify the general idea of process extension, and the dispute about cognitive extension in particular, consider a biological case, then a cognitive one. Adams and Aizawa (2001) concede an extensionist interpretation of digestion in some spiders. Before ingesting their prey, some spiders inject the prey with enzymes that liquefy the prey's innards. Thereby, the spiders control and anchor feedback processes of digestion that extend beyond their own bodily bounds: they produce substances that they manipulate to interact outside their bodies with other substances, and they then exploit the products of those external interactions to shape their internal digestion. Adams and Aizawa allow that these external interactions constitutively shape the spider's digestion process, so that its digestion extends beyond its bounds.
But Adams and Aizawa, and TEM proponents generally, resist extensionist interpretations of cognitive cases. When teachers show others how to solve a math problem, the teachers often describe the sequence of mathematical operations involved in the solution by gesturing with their hands towards math symbols they have drawn. As shown in more detail below, data suggests the teachers' gesturing lightens their cognitive loads while they explain their math solutions: wholly brain-based cognitive interactions help produce the external gestures, which then feedback into the brain so that working memory is freed.
On TEM interpretations, gestures merely causally shape the cognitive process that produces the given teacher's math explanation. However, on Clark's (2007; see also 2008 ) TEX interpretation, the gestures constitutively shape that cognitive process. Let us say that both TEX and TEM advocates claim that some cognitive processes are transbrain processes. But according to TEX, some extrabrain parts of transbrain 8 I apologize for introducing new acronyms into the debate. If you do not think that the differences just mentioned in the text warrant new acronyms, consider that "TEX" and "TEM" are easier for you to pronounce when talking about the views. They also avoid association with the term "hypothesis" (in favor of "thesis"), which has certain empirical connotations that I am trying to steer us clearer of in this debate.
cognitive processes are cognitive parts of those processes, while according to TEM the extrabrain parts are always uncognitive parts of the transbrain cognitive processes.
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Diverging claims about necessity underlie this dispute. TEM advocates propose conditions that must hold for a part of a process to be cognitive, and TEX advocates deny those claims to necessity. The TEM claims to necessity typically appeal to similarity. Rupert (2004) , for instance, notes that the uncontroversial cases of cognitive process parts are wholly brain-based; he then claims these are so dissimilar from extrabrain parts of transbrain cognitive processes that we should conclude that the extrabrain parts are not cognitive. Adams and Aizawa (2001; also see 2008) are more specific. They identify two necessary conditions for a process part's being cognitive: it must involve non-derived content and feature the same kind of processing as other cognitive processes. The extrabrain parts of transbrain processes do not, they argue, meet these conditions. They leave open just what non-derived content is, and what kind of processing marks cognitive processing. But they do review leading accounts of such content and processing, and note that extrabrain parts of transbrain cognitive processes would not satisfy the content or processing conditions on any of these accounts (see also Fodor 2009) . A concrete example we can use throughout the paper is Adams and Aizawa's preferred account of non-derived content and processing, a computational-representational view of cognition descended from Fodor (1987; 1990) . On this view, cognitive processing corresponds to computations over representational language-ofthought-symbols (LOTS).
10 Were Adams and Aizawa to insist on this specification of their general view, their two necessary conditions for a process part's being cognitive would be that the part a) contains LOTS, which b) computations operate over.
TEX advocates reject these general and specific claims to necessity. Wilson and Clark (2009) suggest that even if any given cognitive process necessarily involves non-derived content, not all parts of the process must involve such content to be cognitive parts; a part must involve non-derived content or be properly related to other parts with non-derived content. 11 Wilson and Clark vie for hybrid cognitive processes, where it is precisely the complementary dissimilarities between tightly integrated parts of the processes that make those parts cognitive and allow for the production of cognitive phenomena.
Having clarified the dispute between TEX and TEM, let me now show that we could never discriminate between TEX and TEM empirically or by theoretical virtues.
Empirical Indistinguishability
Typically, empirical data only favors a given view with respect to a competing view (Royall 1997; Sober 2008) . In this contrastive framework there are two ways we might try to empirically discriminate between TEX and TEM. First, our empirical data could provide bases for discriminating tests between them. Second, our estimates of the predictive accuracy of each might differ. 12 It is best to step through these two possibilities with some light technical machinery. This will afford precision that clarifies the strength of the argument. For evaluators of the argument, the precision will also helpfully illuminate which claims are doing what work.
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3.1 Testability.
11 Wilson (2008) provides a less ecumenical rejection of the TEM appeal to non-derived content.
12 Below I suggest that other means of empirically distinguishing theories are relevantly like one or both of these two ways, such that these two ways represent all the options for empirical distinguishability. 13 The machinery and associated precision also help correct, as we will see, key under-developed claims that TEX and TEM authors make and which are of a sort more thoroughly addressed in the philosophy of science using some machinery. For a flavor of the under-development, see Rupert's 2004 and appeals to empirical power, conservativism and simplicity, as well as Clark's 1997 Clark's , 2007 appeals to explanatory unification, empirical bets, and empirical considerations, respectively. 14 So long as we agree that in most contexts empirical support is essentially contrastive, my discussion of testing will apply whether you think tests between hypotheses provide reasons for thinking one hypothesis is more probably true than the other (as most likelihoodists and Bayesians do), or instead reasons for not rejecting one and rejecting the other (where this question is independent of truth). Thus it will be harmless when, for convenience, I write as though taking one of these two testing perspectives rather than the other. When discussing predictive accuracy in Section 3.2 it will be more important to adopt an instrumentalist perspective.
Let's adopt a necessary condition of testability from Sober (2008) cognitive load, where cognitive load refers to burdens on an agent's working memory processes, especially while she is attempting to learn or instruct (Sweller 1988; 1994) . Researchers indirectly measure effects on cognitive load during, say, instruction, by assessing performance on other related cognitive tasks.
To measure the effect of gesture on working memory processes implicated in explaining math solutions, Goldin-Meadow et al. (2001) quantified performance on a recall task performed simultaneously with the explanations of math solutions. Before subjects began explaining a math solution (which they had already completed themselves), the experimenters gave them a list of words (in the case of children)
or pairs of letters (in the case of adults). Subjects were to hold the list in mind while explaining the math solution, then recall the list for experimenters after they had finished explaining the math solution. In the control condition, subjects were permitted to gesture while explaining their solutions, which were on a chalkboard. 17 In the manipulation condition, they were not to gesture while sitting at a table and explaining their solutions.
Consider two tests one might run with this experimental design. The first is a test Goldin-Meadow and colleagues ran, the second is a hypothetical test between TEX and TEM.
In the actual experiment, the auxiliary assumptions, A, that researchers coupled with hypotheses to make predictions involved assumptions about potential experimental error and the effectiveness of controls. 18 Let's presume these assumptions are true. Two of the hypotheses then proposed were:
Gesturing lightens the cognitive load of the working memory system involved in explaining the math solution, such that it shapes the cognitive process(es) underlying the explanation of that solution.
H 2 : Gesturing is epiphenomenal with respect to the cognitive load of the working memory system involved in explaining the math solution, such that it is epiphenomenal with respect to the cognitive process(es) underlying the explanation of that solution.
These hypotheses generate the following competing predictions:
H 1 &A Prediction: Subjects instructed not to gesture perform poorer on the recall task than subjects allowed to gesture.
H 2 &A Prediction: Subjects instructed not to gesture perform about the same on the recall task as those allowed to gesture. 17 The authors do not say whether permitted gesturing was explicitly or implicitly permitted. But they appeal to the permitted cases to rule out certain confounds in a way that suggests permitted gesturing was implicitly permitted (Goldin-Meadow 2001, p. 521) . 18 Controls were to show the following: remembering not to gesture does not tax cognitive load; gesturing does not diminish with increasing difficulty of math problems explained; math expertise does not affect recall performance; gesturing does not save explanation time; significant changes in recall performance between test conditions cannot be attributed to gesture shifting cognitive load from one cognitive system to another (rather than lightening load on a single system); the explanation and recall tasks involve the same working memory system; and so on.
These predictions appear identical. However, the shared allusion to "poorer" performance by nongesturers is vague. Do these predictions, and so the hypotheses from which them come, differ at a more fine-grained level by suggesting differing degrees of poorer performance by the non-gesturers?
No. H TEX and H TEM are predictively equivalent because the difference in the natures they attribute to the shaping relation-and the implied difference in whether external features are cognitive-is undetectable by observation of performance on the recall task. But nothing special about the recall task makes this true. The problem is more general. Both advocates of TEX and those of TEM claim that some external features hook up with brain-based cognition in crucial, productive, explanatory ways. But from our observational perspective, nothing about the transbrain productive processes thus formed, or the cognitive phenomena produced by those processes, depends on whether only the brain-based parts of those processes are cognitive or instead some extrabrain-based parts of those processes are also cognitive.
More generally, there is just one thing about the transbrain processes that depends on which of the two possibilities is the case: which of the contested process parts are cognitive and which are not. Talk of process parts fills in this argument. Let P be any cognitive phenomenon that any transbrain process T produces. T will include some external feature F as a proper part, since it is a transbrain process. Further, some portion of T will be cognitive; call this C. One way to articulate the difference between F's constitutively shaping C, and F's causally shaping C, is to say that F constitutively shapes C just when F is not only a proper part of T, but also of C; otherwise, F merely causally shapes C. 19 But in this context of processes, the proper part relation is similar to the causal relation in ways that preclude the testability we seek. Both relations are diachronic and productive. If F causally shapes C, F produces an effect E that is a part of C, and F is temporally prior to E. But F also does this if it constitutively shapes and is a proper part of C. And in either case, F helps produce P in virtue of producing E in C. The only relevant difference between the two possibilities is this. In one case the line between what is cognitive and what is not falls between F and E, so that E is part of C (is cognitive) and F is not (is not cognitive); in the other case the line falls before F, so that both F and E are parts of C (both are cognitive). Alternate this line's location between the two possibilities and you get no corresponding detectable difference. F remains temporally related to E in the same way, there is no change in production that we could infer, no change in any laws we could discover, no change in any entity that we could detect. There must be some such change if we are to discriminate the two possibilities by empirical test, but there is not. F can be as (dis)similar to the brain-based parts of C as you like, and the shaping relation between F and C can be as integrated as you wish, and all of this will still hold.
Thinking in term of cognitive states, instead of processes and their parts, may have concealed this conclusion from parties to debate about extended cognition. Going astray in this way is especially easy when we pair our thinking about states with a common understanding of the constitution relation that is in play. Typically, we think of the constitution relation as a synchronic relation of unique determination between states (or properties etc.) such that if B constitutes state C, then B at time t is necessary and sufficient for C at t. Put this consequent differently: iff B at t, then C at t. We then seem to have a basis for empirically testing between TEX and TEM claims, at least in principle. Let C be some state that both sides agree is a cognitive state of some system of ours. Let B be some brain feature of ours. If we introduce E as some (perhaps variously tokened) type of external feature in our environment, it is natural to think that some competing TEM and TEX claims take the following forms, respectively:
TEM Hypothesis: Iff B at t, then C at t TEX Hypothesis: Iff E+B at t, then C at t
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Converting TEX to a claim about synchronic coupling cannot save the testability that I extinguished by emphasizing the diachronic nature of the disputed cases. In the cases we have considered, part of the problem for testability is that the very external features that TEXers seize upon will be the same ones that TEM insists, in its promotion of the embedding of cognition, are causally and explanatorily important for cognition: empirical testing is sensitive to causal explanatory features, but in disputed cases, TEX and TEM will both agree that the external features in question are among the explanatory causes of cognition.
The form of the problem remains the same if we switch TEX from a view about external features that is partially motivated by how those features diachronically relate to brain features in tightly integrated and productive ways, to a view about external features that is partially motivated by how those features synchronically relate to brain features (and cognition). This is because we must continue to respect TEM's insistence on the embedding of cognition, by having it also recognize any explanatorily impressive synchronic relations between external and brain features (and cognition). In effect, both views can insist that external features sometimes lawfully and synchronically couple with brain features in ways that help explain cognition. The lawful relations they both could recognize would be testable, but irrelevant here precisely because both TEX and TEM accept them. The only difference between TEX and TEM would be that TEX makes the additional claim that the external features are constitutive of cognition, while TEM would deny this addition. But empirical testing would be insensitive to this disagreement, as in the diachronic case. For example, TEX Hypothesis and TEM Hypothesis would still mischaracterize TEX and TEM, though in slightly different ways. We would flip from TEXers agreeing with TEM Hypothesis (and denying the hypothesis we attributed to them), to TEMers agreeing with TEX Hypothesis (and denying the hypothesis we attributed to them). In the disputed cases, both proponents of TEX and TEM would accept claims of the form "iff E+B at t, then C at t." And so the results of tests in which we fix B and manipulate E could not discriminate between the views. The remaining and untestable disagreement would be about the interpretation of the necessity of E at t for C at t. TEX proponents would interpret this as suggesting that E is a constitutive part of C's realization. TEM proponents would interpret it as suggesting that E is a part of the needed and important context within which the real constitutive parts of C's realization to do their work of determination.
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So, returning from our foray into synchronic cases, imagine that our technologies enjoy stunning advances and we are able to observe (not merely test for) all physical inner workings of cognitive processes, and all their products. We observe many transbrain cognitive processes and (to the chagrin of Fodor's critics) discover it is a fact that all and only the brain-based parts of those transbrain processes involve LOTS that are computed within those processes. This could leave the dispute between TEX and TEM entirely open. For instance, given the discovery, TEM advocates such as Adams and Aizawa might make the step from insisting that cognitive process parts necessarily involve non-derived content and certain processes, to further specifying that those parts necessarily involve computations over LOTS. But TEX advocates could insist that although all and only brain-based parts of the transbrain processes do (we are supposing) involve computed LOTS, computed LOTS are not necessary for a process part's being cognitive. For instance, the minds of Martians might involve cognitive processes with no computed LOTS. Granted, Martians may have something sufficiently like computed LOTS. But TEX advocates could also maintain that what is necessary (or sufficient) for a process part's being cognitive is not simply containing computed LOTS or something sufficiently like them, but rather containing such things or being properly related to a process part that does contain them. Both disjuncts in this disjunctive TEX condition would predict the occurrence of the computed LOTS that we are supposing we have discovered in all observed instances of cognition, just as the specified TEM condition would predict. The discovery would not, could not, be a test that discriminates between the TEX and TEM conditions. We could never empirically discriminate by test between such competing claims, in any TEX-TEM dispute. Let me now turn to close off the only other option for attempting to empirically distinguish TEX and TEM.
Predictive Accuracy Estimation.
Section 3.1, could we empirically distinguish any competing TEX and TEM models in terms of predictive accuracy?
No, and this is clear given the reasons for the results in Section 3.1. Every method of estimating predictive accuracy relies just on measures of fit-to-data and simplicity (Hitchcock and Sober 2004) . My foregoing argument implies that any competing TEX and TEM models will score precisely the same on fit-to-data. But less obviously it also implies those models will score precisely the same on simplicity too, because they will have the same number of adjustable parameters. Such parameters are posited in order to track and accommodate lawful and/or production relations between phenomena modeled. But as we saw, no such relations within the transbrain productive processes that TEX and TEM advocates argue about will depend on whether only the brain-based parts of those processes are cognitive or instead some extrabrain parts of those processes are also cognitive. Thus the dispute about what counts as cognitive will not give rise to differing numbers of parameters between competing TEX and TEM models. Given also the equivalence in fit-to-data, any competing TEX and TEM models can enjoy identical estimates of predictive accuracy. The reasons I have given for this ensure that we cannot empirically distinguish TEX and TEM by related methods either (more on this in the next section). And since the only other means we have for distinguishing them empirically (by empirical test) is also unavailable, we can never empirically distinguish TEX and TEM.
For all this, there may remain a metaphysical fact of the matter about whether external features that shape cognitive processes do so causally or constitutively. Nothing I have said rules this out. 24 Rather, if there is such a fact, I have ruled out our empirical access to and consequences of it. It is also important to emphasize that this is a claim about our empirical access. Perhaps there is a possible world with fantastical creatures who observe metaphysical process part-whole relations, or who in any case empirically discriminate between the claim that some external features that help produce cognitive 24 Some authors such as Alan Sidelle (1989) might disagree. Partially from compelling claims about imagination-based approaches being our only promising approaches to the epistemology of necessity, Sidelle draws the conclusion that issues of necessity-such as the one underlying the TEX-TEM dispute-are conceptual and conventional, not metaphysical. I am unsettled about his conclusion. One worry is that the world may determine the truth values of claims to necessity even if we cannot see this past our concepts and conventions. The outstanding issue is whether we have good reason to think the world does this.
Most appeals to unification in the TEX-TEM debate are also brief and vague. An exception is Andy Clark's (1997, pp. 110-113) claim that some "emergent" TEX explanations are more unified than TEM alternatives. According to Clark, these TEX explanations appeal to "collective variables," which track patterns resulting from interactions among multiple features. These features may include both external and brain features, in which case the system to which the emergent explanation appeals extends beyond the brain. But TEM advocates can take all this onboard. They can appeal to the same collective variables and corresponding extended systems. In doing so their explanations would differ only by not deeming any external features cognitive. If epistemically significant unification depends on differences in number of variables, there is no epistemically significant difference in TEX and TEM unification here. This same line of skepticism would also afflict any TEX or TEM advocates' attempt to utilize Kitcher's (1989) wellknown account of unification, or similar accounts of unification revised to overcome the well-known problems with Kitcher's view (see Woodward 2003) . On the only other accounts of epistemically significant unification that I know of, unification is a function of, or tracks, epistemically significant simplicity (see Sober 2003) . But the above problems for the appeal to simplicity follow TEX or TEM appeals to such unification.
Finally, TEX advocates sometimes suggest their view enhances understanding more than TEM does (e.g., Clark 2007) . Unfortunately, on the only rigorous attempts to explicate such enhancement as an epistemically significant virtue, enhancement stems from unification (e.g., Friedman 1974) . But perhaps there is a promising idea in the vicinity, one best considered in terms of theories rather than explanations:
either TEX or TEM may better help us generate hypotheses. Even though all the same predictions and discoveries appear available to TEX and TEM, one of these views may provide a more inspiring or clarifying (and so perhaps more expedient) vantage point from which to study cognition.
Clark sometimes hints that this is ultimately what he has in mind, such as when he calls TEX a mere "guiding idea" (p. 13) that helps structure research pursuits. Sometimes he even grants that the virtue of hypothesis fertility may favor TEM over his own view in some contexts: "as cognitive scientists we can (and should) practice the art of flipping between these different perspectives, treating each as a lens apt to draw attention to certain features, regularities and contributions while making it harder to spot others, or to give them their problem-solving due" (p. 19). This passage locates the virtue of hypothesis fertility clearly within the context of discovery, not the context of justification that has concerned me here (Reichenbach 1938) . It may be worth pursuing this basis for choosing between TEX and TEM within the context of discovery. But the pursuit will be steep because there is so far no systematic discussion of such a basis.
Conclusion and Debate Relocation
There may be good pragmatic reasons for privileging one of TEX or TEM with, say, more research resources than the other. 
